Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will

Translated by J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnson

Fleming H. Revell, 2004, pgs. 320.

Summary: At the behest of the Pope and the Catholic party, Desiderius Erasmus (1466/9-1536) wrote a little book called Diatribe de Libero Arbitrio defending a semi-Pelagian to Pelagian view of the will (cf. Pelagius, Roman Commentary review) in 1524. According to Erasmus the fallen human will has enough residual goodness within itself to cooperate with grace or perhaps to do some small good without grace.

Erasmus was latitudinarian on salvation. He wasn’t terribly concerned if people believed the Catholic gospel, Luther’s gospel, or whatever Erasmus held as his private beliefs, as long as there was civil peace. The Diatribe is an attempt to establish peace—private leisure for Erasmus to study and European religious accord.

Martin Luther (1483-1546) responded with The Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio) in 1525. Luther was stringent on the gospel: believing the wrong gospel sent one to hell. And Luther was willing to overturn the whole world so that some might believe and be saved.

The Bondage of the Will is Luther’s master piece. He speaks, fights, and thinks with fire that warms, burns, and delights in turn. Nowhere is he more brilliant, earnest, more systematic, or more careful in his exegesis of Scripture. Luther argues with the Bible in hand, his scholastic credentials fully exposed and exhibited, his native Saxon wit sharpened by wide classical reading, and a heart softened by the Spirit.

Luther’s argument theological and exegetical can be summarized in two paragraphs:

So when Ecclesiasticus says, ‘If thou are willing to keep the commandments, and to keep the faith that pleaseth me, they shall preserve thee,’ I fail to see how ‘free will’ can be proved from his words. ‘If thou are willing’ is a verb in the subjunctive mood, which asserts nothing. As the logicians say, a conditional statement asserts nothing indicatively—such statements as ‘if the devil be God, he is deservedly worshipped’; or, ‘if an ass flies, an ass has wings’; or, ‘if there be “free will’, grace is nothing’. And if Ecclesiasticus had wished to assert ‘free-will’, he ought to have spoken thus; ‘man is able to keep God’s commandments’; or, ‘man has power to keep the commandments’. (151)

Wherefore, my good Erasmus, as often as you confront me with the words of the law, so often shall I confront you with the words of Paul: ‘By the law is knowledge of sin’—not the power of the will! Gather together from the big concordances all the imperative words into a chaotic heap (not the words of promise, but the words of the law and its demands)—and I shall at once declare that they always show, not what man can do, or do do, but what they should do! Even grammarians and schoolboys at street corners know that nothing more is signified by verbs in the imperative mood than what ought to be done, and that what is done or can be done should be expressed by verbs in the indicative. (159).

Erasmus and all Pelagians and most semi-Pelagians argue that an imperative verb requires or implies an intrinsic or natural power to obey. The power is presumed as a condition of justice on God’s part. The Lord ought not to command what cannot be obeyed. Yet the argument is a moral assessment and not a logical necessity. Because it’s not a logical issue, the disagreement can only be resolved by biblical texts descriptive of human power or God’s moral obligation.

Thus Erasmus must provide a declarative statement from Scripture stating something near “man has power to keep the commandments.” Yet he is faced with the difficulty that Scripture provides the exact opposite: “For to set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace. For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God's law; indeed, it cannot. Those who are in the flesh cannot please God” (Rom. 8:6-8, ESV) [See Luther’s comments on pg. 300].

The second option for Erasmus is to demonstrate that God allows free will as a moral obligation to humanity to judge them. But again this is broken by declarative statements of Scripture: “And the LORD said to Moses, ‘When you go back to Egypt, see that you do before Pharaoh all the miracles that I have put in your power. But I will harden his heart, so that he will not let the people go.’” (Exod. 4:21) [See Luther’s comments pg. 193.]

Erasmus attempts with Origen (c. 185-254) and Jerome (c. 347-419) in tow to argue that passages about deafening and hardening are tropes, but Luther ably disabuses his readers. And closes the book pleading with Erasmus to submit to the gospel.

Benefits/Detriments: The Bondage of the Will is a delight to read and answers most questions on the issue of the free will in salvation and pleasing God among Christians. Arminius (1560-1609) managed to shift the argument a bit in his theology proper, but Luther is still helpful in this regard as well (cf. review of God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius). Highly recommended for all.