Albrecht Ritschl, Three Essays: Theology and Metaphysics, “Prolegomena” to The History of Pietism, and Instruction in the Christian Religion

Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1972, 301pgs. 

Summary: The volume translated by Philip Hefner was designed to introduce the basic theological framework of Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889). 

Ritschl is in the line of German theologians and philosophers beginning with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) continuing through Schleiermacher (1768-1834, cf. review), and Barth (1886-1968, cf. reviews). His basic concern is to reformulate Christianity around the self-consciousness of humanity embodied in Kantian philosophy and Spinoza’s conclusions of the dependence orthodox Christian and Jewish theology on Greek philosophy (cf. review). There is also a steady pressure from Hegel (1770-1831) and his dialectic to see history as progressing towards “modern” conclusions in contradiction to the “primitive” past. 

Standing against Ritschl within the Lutheran and German Calvinists churches were two conservative opponents the pietists and the creedalist. The pietists were essentially folks who retreated from scholastic debate and dogmatism into fideism and mysticism.  The creedalist were those who attempted to maintain historic orthodoxy through maintaining creedal markers. Ritschl’s liberal audience were those who had or were removing themselves from Christianity due to the implications of Kant, Hegel, and Spinoza’s philosophy. 

Ritschl’s goal was to save Christianity in the modern era by assuming the truth contemporary philosophical conclusion and accommodating Christian doctrine to the new natural and metaphysical philosophy.   

"Prolegomena” to The History of Pietism

Ritschl desired to prove that pietism and to a lesser degree the Reformation were an unfortunate and historical response working for the “restoration of the proper relationship between Christianity and the world based on the assumption that the relationship has passed over into confusion of Christianity and the world” (67). 

The roots of pietism were found in the “Franciscian reformation” (c. 1181-1226) which attempted to bring all Christians into either a monastery separated from the world or into ordo tertius de poenitentia also distinguished from the world. These tertiaries were “composed of lay congregations of men, and women as well, for whom [Francis] provided a comprehensive rule of twenty articles” (64). “It is especially noteworthy that the Franciscan reformation of the catholic church was based on the principle of the primitive church, which was still free of confusion with the world (67). 

Further, the pietistic concern over how the world and church related were driven by non-Christian and mystical religious and philosophical ideals: “Mysticism in the Christian church is actually a growth of neoplatonism, for the leading idea, which is common to both this philosophy and to mysticism as well, is that God is not the world but that his the denial of the world” (76).  

Ritschl then connects the Anabaptist movement to the Lutheran pietistic movement, the  Anabaptist to the Franciscan tertiaries, and the entire lot to  mysticism; thus disqualifying all these parties from modern participation in Christian dialogue. (He also includes a series of swipes at Calvin.) 

Ritschl made all these arguments admitting that they cannot be documented:, “I sharpened this hunch into the hypothesis that the Anabaptist emerged directly from the circle of the Franciscan tertiaries, in particular, from the Observants. Since I could not support this hypothesis through any documentary evidence. . .” (78). And, “Even if the fifteenth century did not offer us a single document indicting that the Franciscan-Observants had propagated their fundamental objection. . .” (67). 

Theology and Metaphysics

In the second essay Ritschl responded to orthodox scholars noting his rejection of the historical understanding of God. 

Ritschl rejected the traditional theism because he believed that Kant proved it was impossible to know God in his nature (omnipresent, omniscient, self-existent, and Trinitarian). Thus the Bible must now be read through Jesus Christ as the only source of the knowledge of God. We know God only through description of Jesus, and we know Jesus only through the church. 

Again the author fences with the historically orthodox and the pietism. Ritschl’s irritation, contempt, and impatience for traditional conceptions of God and his opponents is palatable:  

The personal relationship of God or Christ to us, however, is and remains mediated through our precise recollection of the word, i.e. of the law and the promise of God. And God works upon us only through the one or the other of these revelations. The basic assertion of the immediacy of certain perceptions and relationships raises the question of distinguishing between reality and hallucination. Those who maintain the pretension of having an immediate personal relationship to Christ or God are apparently not well-read in the literature of mysticism (196).

He then makes a half-hearted effort to prove that Luther agrees with him: and then attempts to show that Melanchthon reverted back to the pre-Luther Platonic philosophy. “Melanchthon frustrates the reshaping of the doctrine of God which he himself lays down by a formula which he describes as the summation of the biblical affirmations about God, but which, in reality, represent a capitulation to the neoplatonic and scholastic position” (206).  

Instruction in the Christian Religion

Ritschl attempts to correct and replace Lombard, Calvin, and Melanchthon by writing a theology textbook for high school students (220). 

He begins by rejecting the authoritative nature of the Old Testament (222). The next step is for humanity to recognize that while they are products of the world they are actually greater than the world and therefore must advance the Kingdom of heaven which is the “highest good of its members” (224). 

Those pursuing the “Kingdom of heaven” gather together in churches or communities, and these communities mediate faith to the individual. 

The kingdom of God is the divinely ordained highest good of the community founded through God’s revelation in Christ; but it is the highest good only in the sense that it forms at the same time the ethical ideal for whose attainment the members of the community bind themselves to each other through a definite type of reciprocal action (222).

Church discipline and a countercultural definition of marriage are artifacts of the opposition of Christianity to Judaism and paganism. By maintaining such distinctions the church has become a state within a state, and this should be dropped. The ordering of the church is “limited essentially to the maintenance of the preaching office” (259). 

God’s purpose in the system is to provide benefits to humanity; thus in rejecting vicarious atonement and the covenant of grace and works he notes:

Now all law is binding only because the lawgiver shows himself a benefactor, maintainer of public weal. Thus the goodness of such a benefactor is the motive for the recognition of his law by the society he founds. Applied to God, this principle shows that the experience of God’s goodness or grace is precedent to every law which gives expression to the mutual rights between God and man (277, ft. 113). 

And then he grinds through rejecting almost all orthodox doctrines or modifying them. Heaven and hell are cast aside, “since a consistent eschatological theory cannot be gained from the data of the New Testament, the hints of the New Testament as to the condition of the blessed and the lost lie beyond the possibility of clear presentation”(254). 

The vocabulary of Christianity is continued, but the meaning is radically altered. Sin “is established by the impulse of unrestrained exercise of freedom, with which everyone comes into the world and meets the manifold attractions to self-seeking which arises out of the sin of society” (232-233). The Holy Spirit is an impulse towards good

Detriments/Benefits: Helpful for students of Barth and historical theology. Almost completely worthless for spiritual edification, unless you happen to be a late Enlightenment liberal wanting to trust both Kant and Jesus.